Showing posts with label Darfur. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Darfur. Show all posts

Monday, November 5, 2007

Hope Fading Fast: The Conflict in Darfur Continues

The situation in Darfur has only worsened with time. With increased attacks on peacekeepers (such as the one pictured in the graphic at left) and overall violence skyrocketing, peace appears to be slipping out of reach for the people of Darfur. They continue to suffer while the international community dawdles, unwilling to fully commit to ending this nightmarish genocide. Although the establishment of the UNAMID (UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force) has mustered some sentiments of hope for change, (as I previously reported on) with time, it too has been proven ineffective in implementation. Deploying these troops to start preventing atrocities committed against Darfurians has been painfully slow at best, with hardly any troops actually having set foot in Darfur to date. Meanwhile, the people wait. This week, I decided to explore the blogoshpere to see how others might be feeling regarding the current state of affairs in Darfur. I commented on two blogs discussing different aspects of the conflict in Darfur. The first is from Britannica Blog, an intellectually stimulating compilation of blogs written by accredited authors. The post is entitled “Darfur: A Problem Worth Solving” by Alex Meixner, the Director of Government Relations for the Save Darfur Coalition. The second is from the Reuters AlertNet Newsblogs, on the post “Women Say Darfur Peace Won't Work Without Them”, by Megan Rowling, who was previously a journalist before working full time for AlertNet. My comments can be seen in their original context by clicking on the titles above, but are also reproduced below.

Response to Alex Meixner’s Post

Although Darfur has attracted substantial media attention, little has been accomplished in attaining a long-term solution to the conflict. I am the first to agree that raising awareness of a problem is crucial, but it only goes so far. Tangible action must be taken in Darfur to, as you say, “reduce the threat to Darfuri civilians of physical violence,” and most importantly, “to achieve a lasting political solution to end the conflict altogether.” I could not agree more, because without the stability of a political solution to remedy all sides of the conflict, any physical peace would be a façade and doomed to failure.

In reading your post, I cannot help but draw comparisons between Darfur and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Both are based on fictive racial divides arbitrarily created by outside parties; in Rwanda with the Belgians fostering hatred and resentment by creating the irrational distinction of Tutsis as superior to Hutus, and in Darfur with the separation and differential treatment of “Arabs” and “Africans,” though, as you point out, both parties are “Muslim, speak Arabic, and share the same skin tone.” Thus, I fear another parallel can be drawn in the lack of action within the international community to halt these genocides. In Rwanda, it was much too late before sufficient attention was given to this atrocity. The international community has undoubtedly dragged its feet in taking effective action in Darfur, but all is not lost. The establishment of the UNAMID force shows promise, but not unless it is deployed as soon as possible. Otherwise, it is inevitable that Darfur become a horrific repeat of shameful history.

Response to Megan Rowling’s Post

This post offers valuable insight to a struggle within a larger conflict. Women, like those inhabiting refugee camps in masses as seen in the graphic to the right, are a marginalized group who are not usually counted as necessary representatives in the peace process of Darfur. The focus is mainly on rebels and the government, but as you point out, it is very important to also look at “those who aren’t armed,” yet are still just as affected by the situation, if not even more.

My only concern lies in how the numbers of women representatives can be raised, which I agree is a vital task. The fact that women are so ignored within the system may discourage them from attempting to be heard, because they feel as though their efforts will be futile. As you point out, “’even those who have made it into the room don’t really feel like they have a voice,’” so, tragically, what is the point of getting in on negotiations if they aren’t even taken seriously? How do we break this cycle?

I do believe, however, that the international community and negotiators could learn a lot from the actions of these women’s groups. The fact that they are able to “adopt a pragmatic approach and bury their political differences” in order to achieve their common goal is remarkable. If the international community realized that the bottom line is ensuring genocide in Darfur is ended, and countries were able to put their own agendas aside in favor of a larger, humanitarian agenda, then we might have much more progression in saving thousands of lives in Darfur.

Monday, September 17, 2007

The Effectiveness of a UN-AU Peacekeeping Force in Darfur: Abandoning the "African Solution?"

The region of Darfur in Sudan is in definite turmoil. As most observers are aware, the division between more affluent Muslim Arabs in the north, and poor non-Arab black African Muslims and Christians in the south has led to plundering, raping and murdering at random. The persecutors are alleged government-sponsored Arab horsemen deemed “janjaweed” by Africans (the aftermath of one of their attacks is pictured in the graphic to the left). This slaughter has resulted in over 300,000 deaths, and 2.5 million peoples displaced from their homes.

Meanwhile, the international community has mostly stood by and permitted these atrocities to persist. Due in part to Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir’s unwillingness to accept foreign intervention and Western indifference and indolence, the crisis has painfully dragged on from 2003 to present⎯but not without some progress. The African Union (AU), with al-Bashir’s approval, has since deployed 7,000 peacekeeping soldiers into the region in attempt to monitor a ceasefire. More recently, the United Nations (UN) and al-Bashir have come to the agreement of creating a “hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force” deemed UNAMID (UN-AU Mission in Darfur). Currently, the debate is circling around the question of whether the new addition of the UN peacekeeping force will prove effective in bringing this genocide and terror to a close. Through research, it can be concluded that while the new hybrid force is more well-constructed and refined than the previous AU-only force, many matters still stand in the way of this being the final step in achieving peace in Darfur.

Africa, following the times of colonization, has fostered an attitude of “African solutions to solve African problems.” After years of oppression by Western countries, the last thing newly independent African countries wanted were more outsiders meddling in their domestic issues. Although much of this sentiment has faded over time, expressions advocating these ideas resurface occasionally, as with the case of President al-Bashir. He refused UN intervention with peacekeepers when it was first offered in 2004, maintaining that the AU was capable of doing the job and that “allowing a UN force would mean Western re-colonization” for Sudan. Therefore, he only permitted AU troops to be deployed.

Unfortunately, the AU peacekeeping force has proved to be inadequate. Although, according to the Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, the presence of the AU has caused a deterrence in the rape of women, “reduced the recruitment of children into armed forces,” protected aid and humanitarian workers, “reduced the looting of animals belonging to Arab nomads,” and helped return displaced persons to their homes, the AU force is still lacking in many other areas. For one, its size does not permit it to cover what it needs to in terms of landmass. This has led to local people feeling “frustrated with the AU’s lack of protection,” and has left them still feeling consistently vulnerable to attacks. The AU is simply undersupplied, without advanced equipment or technology to utilize. Most importantly though, the AU has a very weak mandate, in the fact that they are not given the authority to disarm or remove janjaweed forces from refugee camps, and are confined to monitoring violence over actively preventing it.

Thus the question remains: will this new “hybrid” force be any more effective? So far, good advancements have been made in that direction. The new peacekeeping officers will come from a selective portion of highly “experienced” personnel. Having veteran officers on the job will get more achieved at a quicker pace. This force will also be much bigger than that of the previous AU, consisting of 26,000 strong. The bigger size in sheer numbers will allow them to cover more ground, and therefore presumably prevent more attacks. The fact that it has UN support also means a bigger budget, and more funding to become properly equipped. Perhaps most vitally, the mandate is much stronger this time around. UN Resolution 1769 grants troops the authority to take “necessary action” with regard to humanitarian worker, personnel, and citizen protection, from armed attacks⎯and if needed, to employ the “strongest use of force.” It also appeases President al-Bashir’s worries of a foreign takeover by requiring the operation be comprised of peacekeepers of “predominantly African character.”

Are Darfur’s prayers answered? Could we finally see an end to the bloodshed? Regrettably, I do not believe this to be so. The mandate still needs much work, and in October when some of the troops are expected to be stationed, it may prove inconsequential. First, although there is a higher number of troops to be deployed, even the 26,000 will be incapable of spanning the entire region, comparable to the size of Texas. This is due mostly to the lack of infrastructure in Sudan (roads, transportation, and power), as the graphic at above right clearly depicts with a bird's eye view of clusters of refugee camps with no roads leading to them nor anything more than shacks to live in. Second, due to the sharing of burden between the UN and the AU, many critics do not see a feasible way for joint oversight to occur effectively without one side always attempting to dominate the other.

Also, although these troops are better equipped than the AU, they are still severely lacking “specialized personnel” to aid in specific aspects of peacekeeping. Despite the fact that the mandate is stronger, it is still missing some key elements, and is already being subject to different interpretations by both Western diplomats and the Sudanese government. The essential points excluded are the ability to disarm militias, pursue and arrest suspected ICC (International Criminal Court) war criminals, and most significantly, the fact that there are no repercussions whatsoever if the Sudanese government decides to demand the exit of all 26,000 peacekeepers. Therefore, in accordance with his previous actions, it is entirely predictable that President al-Bashir will renounce his previous commitments and the situation will remain stagnant.

This leads to the final point that in order for the peacekeepers to be Darfur, “there must be a peace for them to keep,” because “without peace, what is the point of peacekeepers?” In essence, the rebels could just keep fighting, and the government could keep sending the janjaweed to kill and rape thousands more Darfurians. Only time will tell, but in October the answers will become increasingly clear. To give a vaguely dystopian outlook of the situation, I leave readers with one incomprehensible fact: the Sudanese government still insists that the death toll of the “conflict” is a mere 9,000 lives (see the graphic at left).
 
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