Monday, September 24, 2007

And Finally...Peace?: Sierra Leone's Democratic Elections

Governance is one of the most prominent issues in Africa today. Corruption and scandal can be found as regularities in most countries, and the people are the ones who ultimately suffer the most. But last week, a positive advancement in this area was made in the small country of Sierra Leone. Previously associated widely with savage child soldiers and blood diamonds, Sierra Leone held its first democratic elections without the help of the UN, who previously had peacekeepers stationed in the country (right graphic). And most importantly, the transfer of power was peaceful-despite the fact that it was between two opposing parties. This marks the second leader to be democratically elected (the first being while the UN still occupied the country) by the people. This peaceful process has astounded many observers, as Sierra Leone has been torn by bloody civil war since 1991-2002. This week, I chose to investigate what others might be saying regarding this phenomenon through the exploration of the blogosphere. I commented on two pieces of work from different sites, but in reference to the same topic . The first is from the New York Times blog of Nicholas Kristof, on a piece entitled “Africa’s Slow March Toward Democracy: The Latest Step” written by Steve Radelet, a development expert who has resided in both Africa and Asia, taught at Harvard, and worked at the US Treasury, and is currently a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington and economic advisor for President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia. The second is from AgoraVox, a citizen newspaper based out of Europe, on an article entitled, “Sierra Leone: After the Elections…Where to?” by Omar, an African man now living in Hadhramout. My comments on these articles can be seen below, but also in their original full context by clicking on the links above in the article titles.

Response to Steve Radelet’s piece

The people of Sierra Leone are to be commended immensely for this peaceful transfer of power, and I agree it is definitely a step, although slow and tentative, towards societal and political change for Africa as a whole. Considering the country’s previous image, it is remarkable the turnaround this process has signified. Regrettably, I must agree with your point that “Sierra Leone’s elections hardly solve all of its problems”, and expand upon it. Sadly, I find it difficult to be as optimistic about democracies showing “real progress” while people suffer as governments stand by- and in the case of Sierra Leone, aside from its ranking of highest infant mortality rate in the world, 80% are unemployed, and 7/10 live on less than a dollar a day. Sierra Leone’s Anti-Corruption Commission’s funding has been suspended due to serious lack of progression and effort by the government to utilize the money correctly and efficiently, conveying a lack of dedication to the problem. As you mentioned President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia in your article, I believe all African countries can learn valuable lessons from her approaches to governance. She has been extremely effective in tackling with full force issues of corruption by taking hands-on measures, such as firing inadequate “officials”-doing more than just preaching and promising. So yes, this new slowly peaceful democratization marks a positive advancement, but this new regime definitely has much to measure up to before the celebration can really commence.


Response to Omar’s piece

I find your optimism and faith in the country of Sierra Leone inspiring and refreshing. I only wish I could share it fully with you, but I am torn to both sides. I can sense the excitement and change in the air in the transforming image of the country, from “child soldiers who hacked limbs off civilians” to now “secure and peaceful” after these elections and the conclusion of war (left graphic). Yet I cannot help but question that very peace and security. I strongly agree with your statement that Sierra Leone must “reconstruct itself so that it can be secure without outside help”, but I wonder who will lead the country in these efforts? Bad governance is such a prominent issue rampant throughout Africa, and Sierra Leone is no different. In the past, the government has not been fully committed to accountability and transparency, which has made progression difficult to achieve. What Sierra Leone needs most during this period of vulnerability is a strong leader who is willing to fight corruption for the good of the people, and dedicate him or herself to effectively making this happen. It remains to be seen if Koroma can be this man. While it may be true that the people are “serious about the future”, as they proved in these recent elections, the same unfortunately cannot be said yet of the government.

Monday, September 17, 2007

The Effectiveness of a UN-AU Peacekeeping Force in Darfur: Abandoning the "African Solution?"

The region of Darfur in Sudan is in definite turmoil. As most observers are aware, the division between more affluent Muslim Arabs in the north, and poor non-Arab black African Muslims and Christians in the south has led to plundering, raping and murdering at random. The persecutors are alleged government-sponsored Arab horsemen deemed “janjaweed” by Africans (the aftermath of one of their attacks is pictured in the graphic to the left). This slaughter has resulted in over 300,000 deaths, and 2.5 million peoples displaced from their homes.

Meanwhile, the international community has mostly stood by and permitted these atrocities to persist. Due in part to Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir’s unwillingness to accept foreign intervention and Western indifference and indolence, the crisis has painfully dragged on from 2003 to present⎯but not without some progress. The African Union (AU), with al-Bashir’s approval, has since deployed 7,000 peacekeeping soldiers into the region in attempt to monitor a ceasefire. More recently, the United Nations (UN) and al-Bashir have come to the agreement of creating a “hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force” deemed UNAMID (UN-AU Mission in Darfur). Currently, the debate is circling around the question of whether the new addition of the UN peacekeeping force will prove effective in bringing this genocide and terror to a close. Through research, it can be concluded that while the new hybrid force is more well-constructed and refined than the previous AU-only force, many matters still stand in the way of this being the final step in achieving peace in Darfur.

Africa, following the times of colonization, has fostered an attitude of “African solutions to solve African problems.” After years of oppression by Western countries, the last thing newly independent African countries wanted were more outsiders meddling in their domestic issues. Although much of this sentiment has faded over time, expressions advocating these ideas resurface occasionally, as with the case of President al-Bashir. He refused UN intervention with peacekeepers when it was first offered in 2004, maintaining that the AU was capable of doing the job and that “allowing a UN force would mean Western re-colonization” for Sudan. Therefore, he only permitted AU troops to be deployed.

Unfortunately, the AU peacekeeping force has proved to be inadequate. Although, according to the Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, the presence of the AU has caused a deterrence in the rape of women, “reduced the recruitment of children into armed forces,” protected aid and humanitarian workers, “reduced the looting of animals belonging to Arab nomads,” and helped return displaced persons to their homes, the AU force is still lacking in many other areas. For one, its size does not permit it to cover what it needs to in terms of landmass. This has led to local people feeling “frustrated with the AU’s lack of protection,” and has left them still feeling consistently vulnerable to attacks. The AU is simply undersupplied, without advanced equipment or technology to utilize. Most importantly though, the AU has a very weak mandate, in the fact that they are not given the authority to disarm or remove janjaweed forces from refugee camps, and are confined to monitoring violence over actively preventing it.

Thus the question remains: will this new “hybrid” force be any more effective? So far, good advancements have been made in that direction. The new peacekeeping officers will come from a selective portion of highly “experienced” personnel. Having veteran officers on the job will get more achieved at a quicker pace. This force will also be much bigger than that of the previous AU, consisting of 26,000 strong. The bigger size in sheer numbers will allow them to cover more ground, and therefore presumably prevent more attacks. The fact that it has UN support also means a bigger budget, and more funding to become properly equipped. Perhaps most vitally, the mandate is much stronger this time around. UN Resolution 1769 grants troops the authority to take “necessary action” with regard to humanitarian worker, personnel, and citizen protection, from armed attacks⎯and if needed, to employ the “strongest use of force.” It also appeases President al-Bashir’s worries of a foreign takeover by requiring the operation be comprised of peacekeepers of “predominantly African character.”

Are Darfur’s prayers answered? Could we finally see an end to the bloodshed? Regrettably, I do not believe this to be so. The mandate still needs much work, and in October when some of the troops are expected to be stationed, it may prove inconsequential. First, although there is a higher number of troops to be deployed, even the 26,000 will be incapable of spanning the entire region, comparable to the size of Texas. This is due mostly to the lack of infrastructure in Sudan (roads, transportation, and power), as the graphic at above right clearly depicts with a bird's eye view of clusters of refugee camps with no roads leading to them nor anything more than shacks to live in. Second, due to the sharing of burden between the UN and the AU, many critics do not see a feasible way for joint oversight to occur effectively without one side always attempting to dominate the other.

Also, although these troops are better equipped than the AU, they are still severely lacking “specialized personnel” to aid in specific aspects of peacekeeping. Despite the fact that the mandate is stronger, it is still missing some key elements, and is already being subject to different interpretations by both Western diplomats and the Sudanese government. The essential points excluded are the ability to disarm militias, pursue and arrest suspected ICC (International Criminal Court) war criminals, and most significantly, the fact that there are no repercussions whatsoever if the Sudanese government decides to demand the exit of all 26,000 peacekeepers. Therefore, in accordance with his previous actions, it is entirely predictable that President al-Bashir will renounce his previous commitments and the situation will remain stagnant.

This leads to the final point that in order for the peacekeepers to be Darfur, “there must be a peace for them to keep,” because “without peace, what is the point of peacekeepers?” In essence, the rebels could just keep fighting, and the government could keep sending the janjaweed to kill and rape thousands more Darfurians. Only time will tell, but in October the answers will become increasingly clear. To give a vaguely dystopian outlook of the situation, I leave readers with one incomprehensible fact: the Sudanese government still insists that the death toll of the “conflict” is a mere 9,000 lives (see the graphic at left).
 
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